Seattle Journal for Social Justice
Volume 2

Issue 2

Article 29

May 2004

Washington's Constitutional Right to Counsel in Civil Cases:
Acces to Justice v. Fundamental Interest
Deborah Perluss

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj

Recommended Citation
Perluss, Deborah (2004) "Washington's Constitutional Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Acces to Justice v.
Fundamental Interest," Seattle Journal for Social Justice: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 29.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol2/iss2/29

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

571

WASHINGTON’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES:
Access to Justice v. Fundamental Interest
Deborah Perluss1
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and
appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a
refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due
process in the constitutional sense.2

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Powell v.
Alabama,3 involving eight young African American boys. The boys had
been convicted of the rape of two white girls and sentenced to death by an
all white jury in Scottsboro, Alabama. The case became known famously
as the Scottsboro Boys Case. The case was called to trial just six days after
the indictments were issued. Upon separate consolidated petitions for
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether, on
the basis of the record before the court, the defendants were denied the right
to counsel. The Court further asked, if the boys’ right to counsel was in fact
denied, does such denial violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?4
In reversing the convictions, the Court determined that under the
circumstances, the right to appointed counsel was compelled as a matter of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Importantly, the Court did
not rest its decision on the dictates of the Sixth Amendment, which
expressly guarantees a right to counsel to persons charged with crimes in
federal cases. It took another thirty-one years before the guaranty of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in all criminal cases was extended to the
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states through the Fourteenth Amendment. That occurred, of course, in
Gideon v. Wainwright,6 a case involving an indigent criminal defendant
convicted in a Florida court of felony breaking and entering and sentenced
to five years in prison. The fortieth anniversary of Gideon was recently
celebrated.
In the years between Powell and Gideon, the Court affirmatively
determined that the appointment of counsel to a criminal defendant in all
circumstances is not a fundamental right essential to a fair trial and, thus, is
not required as a matter of due process in state criminal proceedings.7
Rather, the Court relied upon the proposition and firm understanding set out
in Powell and corollary state court precedent that “[e]very court has power,
if it deems proper, to appoint counsel where that course seems to be
required in the interest of fairness”8 regardless of the lack of a specific
textual right set out in the Constitution or by statute.
Only subsequent to Gideon did the Court begin to read into the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments a conditional right to counsel based on the extent
to which a criminal defendant risks deprivation of physical liberty.9 That
limitation became firmly ensconced in constitutional jurisprudence when
the Court introduced the presumption that counsel is required as a matter of
fundamental fairness only when the litigant may lose his or her physical
liberty as an outcome of the case.10
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, a five-tofour decision, the Court rested the newly announced presumption on the
remarkable observation that “it is the defendant’s interest in personal
freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
right to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to appointed
counsel.”11 This, the Court asserted, is demonstrated by the earlier ruling in
In re Gault,12 in which the Court declared that children faced with juvenile
court delinquency proceedings are entitled to appointed counsel even
though such proceedings are generally considered civil rather than criminal
in nature. In Lassiter, the Court rested its decision on the statement in
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Gault that “‘the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in
commitment to an institution in which the juvenile’s freedom is curtailed,’
the juvenile has a right to appointed counsel even though the proceedings
may be styled ‘civil’ and not ‘criminal.’”13
Lassiter was an abrupt shift away from the Court’s analysis of whether to
appoint counsel for indigents as a matter of fundamental fairness in any
case, criminal or civil,14 based on consideration of the totality of
circumstances. Instead, Lassiter superimposed a presumption against the
need for counsel if the litigant stands no risk of loss of personal freedom,15
based on the due process balancing test set out in Matthews v. Eldridge.16
After Lassiter, regardless of how grave the private interest at stake, how
limited the governmental interest, and how significant the risk of erroneous
deprivation is likely to be, in applying the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the presumption against appointed counsel for an
indigent in a proceeding not likely to result in loss of personal liberty will
necessarily carry the day.
This article argues that, notwithstanding the Lassiter presumption against
appointed counsel for indigent litigants in civil cases when there is no risk
of incarceration under the federal due process standard, the Washington
State Constitution compels a different, more flexible approach. That
approach rests on the fundamental right of access to justice, which inheres
in the Washington Constitution. The fundamental right of access to justice
requires a court to consider, as a matter of fairness and justice, the litigant’s
ability to negotiate the system of justice in which he or she is found. This
approach borrows from the early right-to-counsel cases, including Powell v.
Alabama, and the courts’ concern for fairness and justice in the particular
proceedings. In contrast, the recent articulation of the due process standards
under Matthews v. Eldridge and Lassiter look to the “interests” at stake to
determine the level of “process” due, including whether counsel is required
to protect those interests.
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This article demonstrates that the Washington Constitution affords
greater protection for the right to counsel in civil proceedings than the
Fourteenth Amendment. This article also shows that in order to give full
credence to the Washington Constitution, the Washington courts must
abjure from applying the “interest-based” Lassiter presumption in favor of a
more functional “access-based” analysis of when appointed counsel is
required to ensure meaningful access to justice. While a court’s tendency
might be to view such renunciation of Lassiter as either paving an
untraveled road or straying into judicial activism, the ability of courts to
exercise their authority to appoint counsel whenever necessary to ensure
access to justice and fundamental fairness is in fact a return to the basic
traditions of our system of justice.
The source of the right to counsel in civil proceedings under the
Washington Constitution may be founded on the fundamentality of access
to the courts as a central precept of access to justice. Unlike the decision in
Lassiter and other federal right-to-counsel cases, the constitutional
provisions available to the Washington courts are not limited to due process
and equal protection. Rather, the structure and text of the Washington
Constitution speaks more to the principles of fairness and justice and the
government’s obligation to secure individual rights contained within the
state constitution. A close reading of the Washington Constitution reveals
that a Washington court has the inherent power to appoint counsel for civil
litigants whenever, as stated in Powell v. Alabama, “it deems proper to
appoint counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of
fairness.”17
This article further demonstrates that application of the federal due
process standards, without consideration of the access-to-justice based
principles embedded in the Washington Constitution, is both fundamentally
unfair and inconsistent with Washington’s constitutional framework.
Indeed, the Washington Constitution compels the appointment of counsel at
public expense whenever a court deems it necessary to secure an indigent
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litigant’s effective access to the state court system through which the
administration of justice is entrusted.

II. NEED FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES
In October 2003, the Washington Supreme Court’s Task Force on Civil
Equal Justice Funding issued a report on the results of a ground-breaking
study that assessed the civil legal needs of Washington’s poor (the Civil
Legal Needs Study).18 The Civil Legal Needs Study concluded that
approximately 75 percent of all low-income households in Washington
State experience at least one civil legal problem per year.19 The study
further concluded that low-income people face 88 percent of their problems
without attorney assistance.20 Moreover, the study found that most legal
problems experienced by low-income people affect basic human needs such
as housing, family safety and security, and public safety.21 Finally, while
no surprise, the study confirms that low-income people who get legal
assistance experience better outcomes and have greater respect and
confidence in the justice system than those who do not.22 The findings of
the legal needs study lead to the inescapable conclusion that a significant
number of poor persons in Washington unnecessarily suffer the adverse
social consequences of homelessness, family violence, family instability,
and inadequate public safety solely because they lack access to competent
legal counsel.
In order to partially address many of the legal needs documented in the
Civil Legal Needs Study, Washington has taken a number of remedial
measures.
For example, non-lawyer facilitators, based in county
courthouses, are authorized by statute23 and court rule24 to provide
assistance to unrepresented domestic relations case litigants. This includes,
among other activities, assistance in completion of mandatory court forms;
assistance in calculating proposed child support; selection, and distribution
of court forms; explanation of legal terms; information on basic court
procedures and logistics such as requirements for service and filing of
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pleadings, scheduling hearings, and complying with local procedures;
previewing documents to be presented to a judge prior to presentation;
attendance at hearings to assist the court with pro se matters; and assistance
with preparation of court orders under the court’s direction. However,
many low-income persons are unable to access these resources because of
insufficient education and literacy, limited English skills, or other factors
such as mental and physical disabilities. Also, facilitator resources are
unavailable for unrepresented litigants in cases outside the scope of
domestic relations.
Washington also provides limited funding to staffed civil legal services
programs that take high-priority needs cases for eligible clients within
certain substantive law areas, subject to several restrictions.25 In addition,
virtually every county operates an organized volunteer lawyer program that
provides free legal services to indigent people. Even with these resources,
however, the Civil Legal Needs Study demonstrates that fewer than one in
five low-income persons are able to obtain the legal services they need to
secure or protect significant rights.
Thus, the question to be addressed here is whether in order to advance the
cause of justice, reduce the social and financial costs of adverse conditions
such as homelessness and family violence, and instill confidence and trust
in the justice system, a right to counsel exists in any civil case not likely to
result in incarceration. The jurisprudential question is twofold: (1) whether
there is any basis in the history of federal constitutional jurisprudence for
the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider the holding of Lassiter, and (2)
whether there is any rationale for states applying their own constitutional
frameworks to deviate from the approach required by Lassiter.
Certainly, in answer to the first question, there is always the possibility of
the U.S. Supreme Court changing course and overruling precedent, as it has
done many times,26 such as in Gideon v. Wainwright.27 However, the
balancing test of Matthews v. Eldridge has taken hold in other contexts,
including lower court determinations of what process is due in non-criminal
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cases.28 Since the way due process is articulated in Matthews and its
progeny is neither particularly nefarious nor a source of judicial angst,29
there seems little momentum at this point either within the courts or among
the advocate community to challenge the Lassiter presumption.
On the other hand, the development of state constitutional jurisprudence
provides some hope that state courts will, in the application of their own
state constitutions and due process requirements, look to other principles
found within their municipal jurisprudence. Thus, they may begin to
construct a framework for analyzing when counsel should be appointed for
indigent persons based on state constitutional principles separate and apart
from those set out in Lassiter.30 The development of state jurisprudence on
the right to counsel under state constitutional provisions is a logical
extension of the Washington state courts’ recent reliance on state
constitutional law to recognize the existence of broader individual rights
and protections than those enjoyed under the federal Constitution.31

III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN WASHINGTON
In Washington, the right to counsel is a product of case law, not
constitutional or statutory text. None of the cases in which the Washington
Supreme Court has established a right to counsel have specifically rested
upon any provision of the Washington Constitution expressly affording a
right to counsel—because no such provision exists. Even in the criminal
context, the Washington Supreme Court observed that either the U.S.
Constitution’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel “inheres” in Article 1,
Sec. 22 of the Washington Constitution (a criminal defendant shall have the
right to appear in person or by counsel32), or the right has been adopted by
court rule.33
In the civil context, the Washington Supreme Court has predominantly
relied on rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court in determining when due
process requires an indigent to be appointed counsel.34 But unlike the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme Court had determined prior to
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Lassiter that indigent parents in dependency actions brought by the state to
permanently or temporarily deprive parental rights have a due process right
to counsel at public expense.35 Those cases rest on the Washington State
Court’s conclusion that the parent-child relationship is so rooted in the
“traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”36
In reaching this conclusion, the court reached back to the common law
recognition that a parent’s interest in the custody and control of minor
children was a “sacred” right.37
Until 1975, the Washington Supreme Court was more concerned with the
fundamental fairness of the proceedings than with whether the case was
denominated “civil” or “criminal.” Because the scope of its analysis in the
right-to-counsel cases encompassed only principles of due process and
equal protection (which focus on the interests at stake), these cases also
rested upon an interest-based approach. But in the early right-to-counsel
cases, the Washington Supreme Court did not strictly limit the scope of the
right in civil proceedings, under either the federal or state due process
standards, to cases involving a high risk of incarceration. Nor did the
Washington Supreme Court draw the distinction between civil and criminal
when fundamental rights of liberty and parental rights were involved.38
Instead, the Washington Supreme Court had relied on the proposition that
“where the individual’s right to remain unconditionally at liberty is not at
issue . . . the right to counsel turns on the particular nature of the
proceedings and questions involved.”39
The Washington Supreme Court had also determined that a right to
counsel exists in proceedings designated as “civil” as a matter of federal
equal protection. In Honore v. State Board of Prison Terms,40 the court
held that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
an indigent state prisoner seeking “civil” habeas corpus relief is entitled to
appointed counsel to assist in prosecuting his petition at the initial hearing
stage and on appeal. This right is afforded when the petition is urged in
good faith, raises significant issues, and the nature of the issues raised

ACCESS TO JUSTICE—A CALL FOR CIVIL GIDEON

Access to Justice v. Fundamental Interest 579

“indicate the necessity for professional legal assistance if they are to be
presented and considered in a fair and meaningful manner.”41 Again, the
court was concerned with the fairness of the proceedings and did not rely on
any categorical expression of when the right to counsel attaches.
This more expansive approach slowed in the 1980s with the Washington
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Walker,42 wherein the court for the
first time affirmatively conditioned the right to counsel on an imminent
threat of imprisonment. State v. Walker was somewhat short lived and not
followed by later courts (because of the intervening decision in the U.S.
Supreme Court case, Matthews v. Eldridge).43 However, any tendency
toward further expansion of the right to counsel under a due process
analysis came to a screeching halt in 1995 with In re Grove.44 This turn of
events was the unfortunate result of the misapplication of federal due
process and right-to-counsel jurisprudence (Matthews v. Eldridge and
Lassiter in particular). In an analytical sidestep, Grove also presented an
overly broad articulation of when a right to counsel exists, which was
unnecessary to the court’s resolution of the case.45 Thus, the growth and
development of right-to-counsel jurisprudence in Washington has been
seriously retarded on the basis of dicta.
In re Grove concerned a request by three separate litigants in three
different cases to pursue their appeals from trial court decisions at the
public’s expense, including the payment for counsel on appeal. In two of
the three cases, a right to counsel was expressly granted by statute. The
first case concerned an appeal from a juvenile court dependency
determination in which right to counsel is afforded “at all stages of the
proceeding.”46 The second case concerned an appeal of an adverse trial
court finding under the state’s violent sexual predator act, which similarly
provides for the right to counsel “at all stages of the proceedings.”47 The
third case involved a claimant who sought public funding of his appeal from
a denial of workers’ compensation benefits, when concededly he had no
statutory or constitutional right to counsel.
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The question in all three cases, as phrased by the court in the combined
opinion, was not whether each claimant had a right to counsel, but whether
he had the right to prosecute his appeal solely because he is indigent,
notwithstanding the existence or absence of a right to counsel.48 Despite the
very narrow scope of the actual issue presented, the court departed into a
lengthy discussion of the right-to-counsel cases and cases addressing the
waiver of court fees for indigent persons. As a result, the court concluded
that because there is no right to counsel in workers’ compensation cases,
there is no right to appeal at the public’s expense.49
Prior to In re Grove, indigent-fee-waiver cases had never turned on
whether a right to counsel existed. Instead, they typically focused on
procedural access to courts and disparate impacts of court fees and other
litigation costs on indigent persons.50 Because there was no need for the
court in Grove to determine whether there is a constitutional right to
counsel in workers’ compensation cases, the apparent clear line drawn
between “fundamental rights” and purely “financial interests” as the
determinant of a right to counsel in civil matters is technically and
appropriately dicta.
While the Washington Supreme Court effectively ceased extending the
right to counsel in civil cases in 1975 with Tetro v. Tetro, none of the later
cases51 examined the relationship between Washington’s guaranties of due
process and equal protection and of access to justice. Moreover, the
Washington courts have never considered whether recurrence to
fundamental principles in the interpretation of these provisions requires a
right to counsel at the public’s expense when it is necessary to insure that
indigent civil litigants have access to the courts. In one recent case,
Miranda v. Sims,52 Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals did
consider whether the fundamental right of access to the courts for a civil
litigant included a right to counsel at public expense. In finding that it did
not, the court relied on In re Grove. However, the court did not foreclose
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the possibility that in an appropriate case, the right of access to the courts
may indeed require counsel.53
The Miranda case involved a request of family members to participate
through appointed counsel in a non-adversarial, investigative inquest to
obtain “an objective, nonpartisan, and independent opinion” into the cause
of the decedent’s death. Indeed, the facts did not present the sort of
compelling circumstances that would necessarily result in ineffective access
to justice. It was “for these reasons,” that the court rejected the family’s
argument that their right of access to justice required appointed counsel.54
However, in an opinion concurring in the result of the case, Judge Anne
Ellington observed:
the right to access to the courts is fundamental to our system of
justice. Indeed, it is the right “conservative of all other rights.”. . .
Where rights and responsibilities are adjudicated in the absence of
representation, the results are often unjust. If representation is
absent because of a litigant’s poverty, then likely so is justice, and
for the same reason.55

IV. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN
WASHINGTON
Access to justice is a fundamental right in Washington. The right is
founded on the text of Article I, Sec. 10 of the Washington Constitution and
case law.56 Article I, §10 of the Washington Constitution mandates that
“[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary
delay.”57 This provision has been repeatedly cited as the source of the
established right of access to justice.58
Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court has on many occasions relied
on the fundamental role that access to justice plays in a democratic society
as the basis for significant initiatives it has taken under its role as chief
protector and promoter of the justice system. For example, in 1994, the
Washington Supreme Court established the first statewide Access to Justice
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(ATJ) Board as an entity of the Washington State Bar Association
(WSBA).59 The ATJ Board was created for an initial evaluation period of
two years. The court order relied upon the fact that “the Washington
judicial system is founded upon the fundamental principle that the judicial
system is accessible to all persons, which advancement is of fundamental
interest to the members of the Washington State Bar Association.”60
In reauthorizing the ATJ Board as a permanent entity that is to operate
within the WSBA, the court reiterated the fundamental principle stated
above and specifically tasked the board to “promote jurisprudential
understanding of the law relating to the fundamental right of individuals to
secure meaningful access to the civil justice system.”61 Those who suffer
disparate treatment or disproportionate access barriers are of particular
concern to the court and singled out for special attention by the ATJ
Board.62
In November 2001, the Washington Supreme Court further
acknowledged the fundamental right of access to justice by its unanimous
order creating a task force on civil equal justice funding.63 While the court
has not to date defined all of the essential components of the fundamental
right of access to justice, it has identified that a specific purpose of the task
force will be to “develop an analysis of and rationale for long-term,
sustained, and permanent state funding for essential legal services for poor
and vulnerable people in Washington State.”64 Washington’s chief justices
have also variously used their positions as chief judicial officers of the state
to speak about the importance of access to justice and the need for indigent
persons to have representation in civil proceedings.65 Extrajudicial
comments of justices have been authoritatively cited in support of
expanded judicial process.66
Whether the Washington Supreme Court is willing to make the leap from
expressions of policy and creation of boards and task forces to a binding
declaration that the right to counsel is an essential component of access to
justice for indigent civil litigants cannot be predicted with any degree of
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certainty. However, if history is any guide at all, one can at least postulate
that conditions are ripe for the Washington courts to consider the question
and, in doing so, to reconsider the Lassiter approach, which led to the
wholly dichotomous (and jurisprudentially insupportable) result in In re
Grove.
A re-examination of the right to counsel as an incident of the
fundamental right of access to justice in Washington effectively must rest
on a proper interpretation of the Washington Constitution. In Washington,
there are multiple provisions of the state constitution that could form the
basis of a claim that a trial court has the inherent authority to appoint
counsel for an indigent person in order to ensure that person’s access to
justice and the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. In addition to
Article I, Sec. 10, these provisions include Article I, Sec. 3 (state due
process guaranty)67 and Article I, Sec. 12 (state privileges and immunities
prohibition and equal protection guaranty)68 as informed by the mandate of
Article I, Sec. 32 (recurrence to fundamental principles).69
Even if no single constitutional provision would provide sufficient basis
for the proposition that a right to counsel is an incident of access to justice
in civil proceedings, a court would be hard pressed to determine that such a
right does not exist at least in some instances of civil litigation. Article I,
Sec. 32 of the Washington Constitution has no equivalent in the federal
constitution; therefore, the recurrence to fundamental principles as a direct
source of rights or an interpretive tool for analysis of other constitutional
provisions need not be subjected to the stringent requirements for state
constitutional interpretation imposed by the seminal case of Gunwall v.
State.70 But for determining whether the fundamental right of access to
justice compels Washington courts to consider the need for counsel in civil
cases beyond the scope allowed by In re Grove, Gunwall offers a useful
analytical framework.71 On the basis of the Gunwall criteria, there is little
doubt that the Washington Constitution provides support for the inherent
judicial authority to appoint counsel to civil litigants.
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V. WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 32
Article I, Sec. 32 of the Washington Constitution provides, “[a] frequent
recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of
individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.”72 Article I, Sec.
32 has been addressed infrequently by the Washington Supreme Court and
rarely in relation to specific claims of individual right.73 It has been used as
both an interpretive mechanism for other rights set out in the state
constitution,74 however, and as a source of substantive rights.75 But, the full
extent of its application and meaning has not been established. At
minimum, based on the express text of the provision, it characterizes the
fundamental relationship between individual rights and free government.
This characterization lies at the heart of the Washington Constitution’s
declaration of rights, finding expression as the first statement of principle.76
This constitutional mandate further compels “recurrence to fundamental
principles.” To “recur” has been defined variously as “to have recourse,”
“resort,” “to go back in thought or discourse,” “to come up again for
consideration.”77 “Recurrent” means “running or turning back in a direction
opposite to a former course.”78 “Fundamental principles” can mean nothing
less than those principles which, by nature, inhere in all humankind,
regardless of their expression in documents and texts governing essentially
political relationships. In State v. Seely,79 while not unconditionally
endorsing the view, the Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that
Brian Snure has argued “persuasively” that the phrase “frequent recurrence
to fundamental principles” “suggests that framers retained the notion that
natural rights should be considered when protecting individual rights.”80
Snure’s suggestion is further supported by the court’s recognition that
when the Washington Constitution was first proposed it contained only
thirty-one sections in Article I. As observed by the court, “[s]ection 32 was
proposed by George Turner, whose later speeches as a U.S. Senator lead to
the conclusion that Turner, like others of his day, believed that
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constitutional interpretation often required a return to natural law principles
beyond the four corners of the constitution.”81
It is on the supposition that the protections and requirements of the
Washington Constitution are not limited by the expressed text of the
document that the Washington Supreme Court found constitutional
protection for the individual right to contract in 189882 and the individual
right to an insanity defense to a criminal charge in 1910.83 The court’s
recurrence to fundamental principles examined the common law treatment
of property rights and persons of unsound mind.84
However, as
demonstrated below, the common law is not the extent of sources of law
regarding fundamental rights and principles that may be recurred in
defining the scope of access to justice under the Washington Constitution.
Finally, with the use of the term “frequent,” the constitution’s drafters
have clearly implored the Washington courts to rely on fundamental
principles and on sources outside the four corners of the document time and
again, in order to protect and maintain individual rights and to ensure that
justice and fairness are achieved.

VI. COMMON LAW SOURCES OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
REGARDING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Certainly on the basis of the Washington Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,
one source of fundamental principles grounded in natural law is the
common law. It is also a source of law to which the court may recur for the
right to counsel for indigent civil litigants. California Court of Appeals
Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., is a leading commentator on the right to counsel in
civil proceedings at common law.85 As Justice Johnson has written:
A rather primitive right to equal justice came to America from
England along with the rest of our common law legal system. At
the time the colonists were settling our nation, this right had
existed under the common law of England for several hundred
years. In 1495, during the reign of Henry VII, the English
Parliament enacted a statute guaranteeing free counsel and waiving
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all fees for indigent civil litigants. This “Statute of Henry VII”
created a right to free counsel for indigent English litigants and
empowered the courts to appoint lawyers to provide the
representation without compensation.86
English judicial decisions extended this statutory right to courts of
equity.87 Blackstone cited the statute of 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12 as the source of
the right to counsel in civil proceedings: “[a]nd paupers…are, by
statute…to have original writs and subpoenas gratis, and counsel and
attorney assigned them without fee; and are excused from paying costs.”88
The statute of Henry VII established a right to counsel for indigent civil
litigants with meritorious claims before the court. The rationale for
Parliament’s enactment of the statute was to ensure that indigent civil
litigants had effective access to the King’s court and was part and parcel of
the rights that attached to in forma pauperis status; the law itself was
denominated An Act to Admit Such Persons as Are Poor to Sue in Forma
Pauperis.89 The purpose of the statute was to ensure that the poor, who had
been effectively excluded from the King’s courts until then, could access
the system of justice then in place.90 That “access to justice” was the
fundamental principle underlying the common law requirement of
counsel—and not the desire to protect an underlying fundamental right or
interest such as liberty or family relationship—is evident91 first, from the
fact that the right initially applied only to civil plaintiffs92 and second, from
the fact that it was the complexity of the legal system itself and the inability
of the poor to hire expert legal assistance that the statute sought to redress.93
Moreover, the only factor considered in appointing counsel was the
litigant’s indigence; the nature of the action or the rights to be enforced was
irrelevant.94 Once a litigant was determined to be indigent, appointment of
counsel was mandatory. The right to appointed counsel in civil actions was
extended to indigent civil defendants by English courts as a matter of
common law applying the same rationale underlying the statute.95
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The statute of Henry VII remained in effect in England until 1883. It was
subsequently replaced by a system of legal aid for paupers administered
under the Rules of Court.96 The fundamental value of access to the courts
and the importance of legal assistance for the poor as a core element of fair
judicial proceedings was carried to the American colonies by the English97
and continues to find expression in contemporary judicial decisions.98

VII. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A SOURCE OF FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES
International Law or the Law of Nations and, in particular, international
human rights law embody those principles that civilized nations have
deemed fundamental. It is another source of applicable law “beyond the
four corners” of the constitution to which Washington courts may recur
under Article I, Sec. 32 to find a right to appointed counsel when required
to ensure access to the courts.99
Over 100 years ago, in a case called The Paquete Habana,100 the United
States Supreme Court declared the duty of a court to apply International
Law “as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination.”101 Washington courts have not shied away from this
admonition and have referenced international law and international human
rights law when important questions of constitutional interpretation have
been presented. For example, in Eggert, et. al. v. City of Seattle,102 the
Washington Supreme Court relied in part on Article 13, Sec. 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights103 as a source for finding an
unwritten constitutional right to travel, which the court determined was
violated by a durational residency requirement for civil service
employment.104 The court further cited the Magna Carta’s proclamation
“allowing every free man to leave England except during wars,” and the
historical growth of this right having in part resulted from “efforts to evade
restrictions imposed by feudal apprenticeship and paupership laws in 17th
century England.”105
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In addition to Great Britain, from which the common law right to counsel
in civil cases originates, other western democratic countries have
recognized a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases either as an
incident of “equal protection before the law” or as an affirmative obligation
to provide equal access to justice for low-income citizens.106 For example,
“France and Germany have provided counsel for the indigent since the
1870s.”107 As reported by Justice Johnson,
Germany has a comprehensive statutory right to counsel in civil
cases heard in the regular courts. Nonetheless, the German
Constitutional Court has also made it clear the nation’s
constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing in civil cases requires
appointment of free counsel for poor people where the legal aid
statute does not.108
In 1937, the Federal Court of Switzerland, that country’s highest court,
held that the Swiss Constitution guarantees that its citizens are “equal
before the law” and requires the governments of the Swiss Cantons to
provide free lawyers to indigent litigants in all civil cases which require
knowledge of the law.109 In that case, the Swiss court observed that “poor
people could not be ‘equal before the law’ in the regular courts unless they
had lawyers just like the rest of the citizenry.”110
Justice Johnson cites numerous other examples of jurisdictions that have
recognized the fundamentality of the right to legal representation for the
poor in civil proceedings as an incident of equal access to the courts.111
However, the broadest and most significant recognition of the fundamental
obligation of government to provide free legal assistance to indigent civil
litigants occurred in 1979, when the right was extended throughout the
European Community by the European Court of Human Rights’
interpretation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in
the case of Airey v. Ireland.112 Importantly, Airey does not rest on the
guaranty of non-discrimination or equal protection under the law, but rather
on the fundamental notion of access to justice.
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Similar to the Washington Constitution’s Article I, Sec. 10 guaranty of
the fair administration of justice, Article 6 of the European Convention
reads, “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time.”113 On the basis of this provision, the European
Court held in Airey that a low-income Irish woman had a protected human
right to counsel as a matter of “fair” access to justice when she sought a
judicial separation from her husband.114
The Irish Government argued in the case that because Ms. Airey’s
personal circumstances created the barrier to her ability to access justice,
rather than any impediment posed by the state, the government had no duty
to remove the barrier.115 Importantly, the European Court rejected that
argument and ruled that “fulfillment of a duty under the Convention on
occasion necessitates some positive action on the part of the State; in such
circumstances, the State cannot simply remain passive. . . . The obligation
to secure an effective right of access to the courts falls into this category of
duty.”116 The court emphasized, however, that free counsel for poor
persons is not necessarily required in all forums, but that governments can
satisfy the duty by establishing forums which are simple enough in both
procedure and substantive law to allow citizens to have a fair hearing
without the assistance of a lawyer.117
Significantly, while Airey was pending before the European Court of
Human Rights, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
adopted a resolution declaring that the right of access to justice and a fair
hearing includes the right to free legal aid and proceedings when necessary
to ensure that no one is “prevented by economic obstacles from pursuing or
defending his right before any court determining civil, commercial,
administrative, social, or fiscal matters.”118
Hence, in the international arena, not only does the right of access to
justice include effective access, but government also has an affirmative duty
to secure the right to individuals. The government can do so either by
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appointing legal counsel for indigent litigants or by simplifying the forums
in which justice is administered to allow lay citizens a fair hearing without
the assistance of counsel.119 In many cases, however, such as for
individuals who may have difficulties communicating with the justice
system due to mental health problems or lack of English language
proficiency, direct legal assistance is essential to secure access to the courts.
Again, as was the case with the common law requirement, it is the
complexity of the law and procedure that provokes the right to counsel and
not the quality or “fundamentalness” of the rights or interests at issue in the
proceeding.

VIII. APPLYING THESE SOURCES OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES TO
WASHINGTON’S ARTICLE I, SECTION 10
In applying both the common law and international law sources of
fundamental principles to interpreting the scope of Article I, Sec. 10 of the
Washington Constitution, it is apparent that this clause contemplates a right
to counsel for civil litigants as part and parcel of access to justice. It is
equally apparent that, when viewed with reference to access to justice, the
rationale of the Washington Supreme Court’s most recent examination of
the question in In re Grove is not sustainable.
Using the Gunwall criteria (the text and structure of the state constitution,
state constitutional law history, pre-existing state law, and matters of
particular state interest)120 to examine the text of the Washington
Constitution, there is no rationale for distinguishing liberty from property or
financial interests in evaluating a litigant’s need to access the courts for a
determination of his or her important personal interests. For example, the
text of Article I, Sec. 3 (due process guaranty) does not distinguish between
the level of process that is due to protect life, liberty, and property—each is
placed on equal footing. Indeed, in recurring to fundamental principles in
Dennis v. Moses, the Washington Supreme Court drew no distinction and
found that the challenged restriction on the free use of property to secure a
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loan was the equivalent of a deprivation of liberty.121 One might argue that
the Washington Constitution affords certain property interests, such as the
home, greater recognition and, therefore, greater procedural protection than
other property or financial interests.122 But In re Grove cuts a wider swath
and includes all property interests in the presumption against a right to
counsel in civil matters.
The cases interpreting Article I, Sec. 10 correspondingly underscore the
importance of due process protections in this state—not just to protect
interests in life, liberty, and property, but also to secure the fair
administration of justice. Indeed, the Washington courts have deemed the
assistance of counsel to be an essential component of the fair administration
of justice. For example, in Honore v. State Bd. of Prisons, the Washington
State Supreme Court ruled that the requirement of appointed counsel
expressly did not rest on the civil nature of the proceedings (post conviction
habeas corpus), but on the lack of fairness in the proceedings in the absence
of counsel as a matter of equal protection.123 And also, in In re Myricks, the
need for counsel to protect the fundamental familial rights at stake was to
ensure the fair administration of justice. The court explicitly stated:
In dependency and child neglect proceedings—even if only
preliminary to later and more final pronouncements—the indigent
parent has to face the superior power of the State resources. The
panoply of the traditional weapons of the State are trained on the
defendant-parent, who often lacks formal education and with
difficulty must present his or her version of disputed facts; match
wits with social workers, counselors, psychologists, physicians,
and often an adverse attorney; cross-examine (often expert
witnesses) under rules of evidence and procedure of which he or
she usually knows nothing; deal with documentary evidence he or
she may not understand, and all to be done in the strange and
awesome setting of the juvenile court.124
The Washington right-to-counsel cases125 provide the guidance as to
some of the essential factors for determining when counsel is needed to
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ensure access to the justice system. These include: first, the imbalance of
power between the parties, for example, a state party litigant represented by
counsel and an unsophisticated litigant unschooled in the procedural rules
of litigation; second, the actual unfairness and the appearance of unfairness
for poor and uneducated litigants to “match wits” with expert witnesses;
third, the need for cross-examination or documentary evidence and the
corresponding complexity of evidentiary requirements related to their
admissibility; and fourth, the nature and formality of the court setting and
the relative comfort level of the litigant appearing in court. On the basis of
In re Myricks, Honore, In re Luscier, and the other pre-In re Grove right to
counsel cases, the Washington State constitutional law history criterion of
Gunwall supports a different, more functional approach to the determination
of when counsel is required in state civil cases than what the federal
constitution dictates.
Washington also has a demonstrated history of particular interest in
access to justice and the need for legal services for the poor. For example,
as early as 1939 the Washington Legislature recognized the importance of
civil legal aid for the poor in the Legal Aid Act,126 which authorized
counties to organize and fund civil legal aid programs. In so doing, the
Legislature declared “[t]he promotion of legal aid . . . to be in the public
interest.”127 The Washington Legislature has further declared as a matter of
legislative policy that “effective legal representation should be provided for
indigent persons and persons who are indigent and able to contribute,
consistent with the constitutional requirements of fairness, equal protection,
and due process in all cases where the right to counsel attaches.”128
Washington has been at the forefront of more recent national efforts to
promote access to justice for the poor. In addition to the various
Washington Supreme Court initiatives cited above,129 the Washington State
Bar Association (WSBA) has also made access to the civil justice system
for poor persons a high priority for its attention. One example is a WSBA
resolution of June 28, 2000, finding that “there exists a crisis in the
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availability of civil equal justice services for vulnerable low-income people
in Washington State.”130
In addition, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Washington Constitution
reflects particular concern for protecting the interests of the poor. Not only
does Article I, Sec. 17131 forbid imprisonment for debt, but Article VIII,
Sec. 7 prohibits any governmental extension of credit, “except for the
necessary support of the poor and infirm.”132 Thus, Washington’s particular
interest in access to justice for the poor finds expression in both law and
policy at many levels of the justice system.
Assuming a right of access to the courts is fundamental, and assuming
further that the Washington Constitution’s guaranty of access to justice
requires appointment of counsel for indigent litigants in some civil cases,
must the government satisfy that obligation? The text of the Washington
Constitution answers this question in the affirmative.
Unlike the federal Bill of Rights, which imposes negative constraints on
the federal and state governments,133 the Washington Constitution contains
an affirmative declaration of rights. The very first article of the Washington
Constitution is the Declaration of Rights, and the express language of the
very first provision declares that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the
people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.”134
This provision, along with Article I, Sec. 10 (access to justice) and Article I,
Sec. 32 (recurrence to fundamental principles), are mandatory by the
express terms of Article I, Sec. 29 of the Washington Constitution, which
reads: “[t]he provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, unless by
express words they are declared to be otherwise.”135
The Washington Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, Sec. 29 as a
directive to the state as a whole to secure the protections of the
constitution,136 but that in the realm of individual rights enumerated in the
constitution, it was recognized that “the courts have ample power, and will
go to any length, within the limits of judicial procedure, to protect such
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constitutional guaranties” (emphasis added).137 Article I, Sec. 10 has been
expressly identified as one of those constitutional guaranties that the courts
have ample power to judicially enforce, even in the absence of
implementing legislation.138 Thus, even in the absence of legislation that
affirmatively requires appointment of counsel in civil cases when necessary
to secure access to justice, Washington courts have the inherent
constitutional power and authority to appoint counsel and as a constitutional
mandate must do so. Therefore, applying the Gunwall criteria of significant
differences in text and structure of the federal and state constitutions, it is
apparent that there is a strong basis for finding a right to counsel in civil
matters beyond the scope of the federal constitution as determined by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Lassiter.139
Thus, the question boils down to: when should a court exercise its
inherent authority to appoint counsel for a civil litigant? Assuming that a
categorical approach based either on the likelihood of incarceration or the
presence of a fundamental liberty interest is not sufficient, what factors
should a court consider in determining when counsel is necessary to secure
access to justice in any given case? While the state’s jurisprudence to date
has not fully examined these questions, one can glean from the
jurisprudence certain considerations that must be part of an informed
court’s assessment in an “access-based” as opposed to a categorical
“interest-based” analysis of when meaningful or effective access to the
court is lacking.

IX. ACCESS-BASED DETERMINATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL
Ideally, an access-based determination would enable a trial court to
survey the totality of circumstances in any case. The trial court can ask
itself whether the parties are sufficiently able to present their claims or
defenses, whether they can coherently present the facts and address matters
of evidence, and if the court has a sufficient command of the information
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available to render a fair and just ruling in the case. Factors related to the
nature of the case that may affect these considerations are, among others,
the complexity of the applicable law, the presence of any procedural issues
that need to be addressed, and the potential existence of cross or counterclaims that could be lost if not asserted. The court might also weigh the
need for expert testimony; the presence of complex evidentiary issues; the
availability of other forums to resolve the dispute; and the extent of or need
for pre-trial proceedings, such as preliminary relief, complex discovery, or
summary judgment motions.
An access-based analysis would also necessarily enable a court to make
reasonable determinations about individual litigants’ differing abilities to
meaningfully participate in the proceedingsparticularly in light of casebased determinations provoked by the above considerations. Such
individualized assessments might include inquiries into the educational
level of a litigant and the litigant’s familiarity with the court system (e.g.,
lay landlords and debt collection agency owners often initiate eviction or
debt collection actions and effectively appear in court without counsel).
Also included within the ambit of an individualized inquiry is whether a
litigant suffers from a mental disability or emotional impairment that affects
his or her ability to understand the proceedings or to communicate
coherently with the court. The presence of a communication barrier or
disability that affects the litigant’s ability to participate effectively or
understand the proceedings is, like the absence of proficiency in the English
language impairing a litigant’s ability to understand the proceedings or to
communicate effectively his or her interests to the court, likely to render the
need for counsel more acute. Similarly, other vulnerabilities such as
physical disabilities or frailtyeither of which may make the need for a
litigant to come to the court a barrier to accessing the justice systemmust
be considered along with the relative availability of resources to mitigate
the absence of counsel. Such alternative resources include qualified
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language interpreters, courthouse facilitators, domestic violence advocates,
and technology.
In addition to the case-based factors and the individualized characteristics
that a court should assess, there are also systemic issues that should be
assessed to determine if the presence of counsel is needed to ensure access
to the courts. These issues include factors such as the balance of power
between the partiese.g., a governmental plaintiff represented by publicly
supplied counsel against an unrepresented person; a young minority litigant
forced to defend his or her interest in a predominantly white justice system;
a wealthy relative seeking custody or other impairment of family rights
from a teenage parent reliant on public benefits programs; a highly abusive
partner versus a domestic violence victim in a dissolution or custody action;
a United States citizen suing an undocumented immigrant. The list can go
on. These assessments, either independently or coupled with an assessment
of the interests at stake, would no doubt demonstrate that at least in some
civil matters that do not concern physical liberty or governmental
impairment of fundamental familial rights, meaningful access to the justice
system compels appointment of counsel.
A court in the exercise of its inherent authority to secure access to its
processes must be empowered to make these assessments and to appoint
counsel at public expense to represent a needy litigant.140 This premise is
what was contemplated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama.
Even though the extreme circumstances of that case called out for the
appointment of counsel, it was ultimately the interest of fairness, given the
particularized circumstances of the Scottsboro Boys and the systemic and
institutionalized obstructions to fairness that so offended the Court’s
sensitivities and compelled the outcome.141
Though admittedly the potential outcome in civil matters can never be
considered as extreme as the execution of a defendant charged with a capital
offense, federal cases Gideon v. Wainwright and In re Gault provide solid
proof that the potential for less extreme personal consequences calls out for
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equally fair treatment. Even if courts were to continue to rely in part on
interest-based determinations of when the right to counsel exists in civil
matters, it is unreasonable to draw the interests as narrowly as that drawn in
Washington’s In re Grove.
The stigmatizing public nature of proceedings impairs important personal
interests not unlike the long-lasting effects of the delinquency finding that
concerned the court in In re Gault.142 These proceedings can include
evictions, debt collections, domestic violence, and custody disputes, among
others. Evictions from government-assisted housing prevent the evicted
tenants from again accessing the public housing programs and ultimately
impair the tenant’s ability to secure substitute housing. Debt collection
actions color credit reports, often impairing the debtor’s ability to obtain
future loans. Other actions can have similar far-reaching, long-term
ramifications. Hence, it is not that far of a leap from the spectrum of
adverse consequences flowing from a criminal prosecution to the very
serious and sometimes devastating consequences that can result from civil
litigation. Regardless of the potential consequences, however, the extent of
the likely deprivation should not be the sole determinant of fair access to the
system—the system charged with the consequence-inducing decisionmaking process.

X. CONCLUSION
Proponents of a fair and just society should no longer need to ask whether
a right to counsel for non-criminal litigants finds support in the fundamental
precepts of a modern civilized societysuch support exists within and
among the historical documents and foundational principles on which they
restat least in Washington.
Courts in Washington are mandated to look back to natural law and other
sources “beyond the four corners” of the constitution to ensure that the
fundamental individual right of access to the courts is guaranteed. Courts
have the inherent constitutional authority to enforce this right and one
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significant mechanism for enforcement is the appointment of counsel when
the totality of the circumstances deems it to be necessary to secure access
for a party litigant. The access-based approach to a review of when
appointment of counsel is necessary takes into account both systemic and
individualized conditions. In contrast to the access-based analysis, a
categorical interest-based right to counsel at best renders the system of
justice that is central to a democratic social order non-user friendly. At
worst, it threatens the very legitimacy and relevance of the system that is
essential to the preservation of the constitutional framework. It is time to
recur again.
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ACCESS TO JUSTICE—A CALL FOR CIVIL GIDEON

Access to Justice v. Fundamental Interest 603

76

“All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain
individual rights.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
77
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 985 (9th ed. 1984).
78
Id.
79
940 P.2d at 620.
80
Id. at 621.
81
Id.
82
Dennis, 52 P. at 339.
83
Strasburg, 110 P. at 1021.
84
In Dennis, 52 P. at 339, the court looked to Blackstone’s definition of civil liberty as
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11 Hen. 7, c. 12 (1495), reprinted in 2 Statutes of the Realm 578 (1969). The statute
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99
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Legal Aid and Advice: Resolution 78 (8) Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe on 2 March 1978 and Explanatory Memorandum (1978).
119
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practices have erected insurmountable barriers to access by those unschooled in the
procedural requirements of litigation and that many changes in the institutional roles of
clerks, judges, and other court personnel could go far to facilitate meaningful access to
the courts short of the need for counsel for civil litigants. See Russell Engler, And Justice
for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of Judges, Mediators,
and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999).
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Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 812–13.
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Dennis, 52 P. at 339 (“The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require
that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred.”).
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of privacy under art. I, § 7 and against levy from debts in the homestead exemption under
article 19. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 19.
123
Honore, 466 P.2d at 493.
124
In re Myricks, 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975).
125
See cases supra at notes 32-36. While cases addressing waiver of fees such as trial
court filing fees (O’Connor v. Matzdorf, 458 P.2d 154 (Wash. 1969)), costs of transcripts
on appeal (Iverson v. Marine Bancorp., 546 P.2d 454 (Wash. 1976)), service by
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costs (Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 557 P.2d 321, 325 (Wash. 1976) overruling, Carter v.
Univ. of Wash., 536 P.2d 618 (Wash. 1975)) have bearing on the Washington Supreme
Court’s access-to-justice jurisprudence, none of these cases rested on art. I, § 10 and in
none did the Court recur to fundamental principles under art. I, § 32. Thus, a full
consideration of the application of these cases is beyond the scope of this article.
Importantly, however, the cases support the conclusion that Washington courts have
inherent power and authority to waive their own procedures and fashion remedies
required to ensure effective access to the courts, and have implications for how a right to
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127
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See supra notes 59–64 and related text.
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http://www.wsba.org/atj/publications/bogresolution.htm (last modified Mar. 10, 2004).
131
Art. I, § 17 provides: “There shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of
absconding debtors.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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Art. VIII, § 7 provides: “No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall
hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any
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individual, association, company, or corporation, except for the necessary support of the
poor and infirm.” WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7. See Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 557 P.2d
321, 333–34 (Wash. 1977) (Horowitz, A.J. concurring).
133
See Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 815 (characterizing the federal Constitution as a “grant of
limited power,” which is true for articles I–III, but not necessarily accurate with regard to
the Amendments, which constrain the federal government from taking acts that violate
individual rights declared and characterizing the state constitution as imposing
“limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the state to do anything not expressly
forbidden,” which does not reflect the mandatory obligations imposed on the state by the
Constitution).
134
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.
135
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 29.
136
See Gottstein v. Lister, 153 P. 595 (Wash. 1915).
137
Id. at 606.
138
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 86, citing IV Wash.Hist.Q. 281, 286 (1913),
quoting Theodore L. Stiles, a member of the constitutional convention and one of the first
justices of the state Supreme Court on principles of state constitutional interpretation and
the self-executing mandatory nature of the state Declaration of Rights:
There have been some excellent provisions in the Constitution from which the
people have had no benefit, because they depend for operation upon action by
the legislature, and that body has neglected to do its duty in the premises.
Considering that by section 29 of the first article every direction contained in
the constitution is mandatory unless expressly declared to be otherwise, it is at
least surprising that in some instances no attempt has been made whatsoever
to set these provisions at their legitimate work.
139
The other Gunwall criteria, which examine pre-existing state law and matters of
particular state interest, also support a right to counsel in civil cases as an essential
component of access to justice. Cases cited at notes 33–36, supra, pre-exist In re Grove
and strongly suggest the importance of counsel in Washington jurisprudence.
140
The decision of whether or not to appoint counsel for an indigent civil litigant may
arguably be considered either a question of law or a question of discretion, and this is
itself an important question which could affect the standard of review in appeals of such
decisions. However, such a question lies beyond the scope of this article.
141
Specifically, with respect to whether the trial court’s failure to make an effective
appointment of counsel was the denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Powell Court stated:
Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other
circumstances, we need not determine. All that it is necessary now to decide,
as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to
employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense
because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law; . . . Let us suppose the extreme case of a
prisoner charged with a capital offense, who is deaf and dumb, illiterate, and
feeble minded, unable to employ counsel, with the whole power of the state
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arrayed against him, prosecuted by counsel for the state without the
assignment of counsel for his defense, tried, convicted and sentenced to death.
Such a result, which, if carried into execution, would be little short of judicial
murder . . .
287 U.S. 45, 71–72.
142
See In re Gault 387 U.S. at 24–25. The Court noted:
Police departments receive requests for information from the FBI and other
law-enforcement agencies, the Armed Forces, and social service agencies, and
most of them generally comply. Private employers word their application
forms to produce information concerning juvenile arrests and court
proceedings, and in some jurisdictions information concerning juvenile police
contacts is furnished to private employers as well as government agencies.
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